Where is Indonesia’s defense strategy heading?

  • Published on 06/10/2025 GMT+7

  • Reading time 4 minutes

  • Author: Gusty Da Costa

  • Editor: Imanuddin Razak

As the Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrates its 80th anniversary, the nation faces increasingly complex security challenges − at home, in the region, and across the globe. 

By Beni Sukadis

At the domestic level, economic and social issues remain the primary sources of tension. Yet at the international level, Indonesia cannot escape the turbulence of great-power rivalries between the United States and China, the U.S. and Russia, the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the rise of non-traditional threats such as cyberattacks and maritime disputes.

It is a truism in international affairs that a country’s defense strategy cannot be separated from its foreign policy foundations. President Prabowo Subianto has set out a vision for national development through Asta Cita, particularly its second pillar, which emphasizes the consolidation of national defense and security while advancing self-reliance in food, energy, water, and in building creative, green, and blue economies. This reflects a broader understanding of defense − one that rests not only on military strength but also on economic and societal resilience.

Yet this ambitious vision risks faltering because Indonesia lacks a clear Foreign Policy White Paper. Without such a guiding document, the country’s diplomacy often appears ambiguous, or even contradictory, when navigating the U.S.–China rivalry, the South China Sea dispute, or the global climate crisis.

A white paper is not a luxury; it is a necessity. It provides short-term, medium-term, and long-term goals that align foreign policy with national interests. It also offers clarity to academics, the public, and international partners about where Indonesia stands in an era of great-power competition.

The absence of such clarity carries real consequences. Defense planning cannot move forward coherently if foreign policy priorities remain undefined. Should Indonesia pursue hedging, reinforce its non-aligned identity, or tilt toward certain alliances? These are strategic questions that cannot be answered in the ad hoc manner that has too often characterized Jakarta’s approach.

Defense policy should not merely react to crises − it must be anchored in a long-term national strategy. The ripple effects are felt across institutions. Without consistent foreign policy guidance, the Ministry of Defense and the TNI struggle to adapt doctrine, training, and resources to evolving global challenges. In the Indo-Pacific, where strategic alignments shift rapidly, Indonesia risks appearing inconsistent in regional forums − undermining the credibility of its defense diplomacy.

The defense industry is another casualty of this ambiguity. Indonesia’s aspiration for self-reliance, as envisioned in Asta Cita, cannot succeed without international cooperation in technology transfer, co-production, and market access. Yet defense partnerships remain vulnerable to political misalignment.

Take, for example, the reported plan to procure China’s J-10 fighter jets while Indonesia is still finalizing the purchase of France’s Rafale aircraft. Such moves could signal a shift in orientation toward Beijing at the very moment when the South China Sea remains a flashpoint in Indonesia–China relations. More troublingly, they risk straining ties with long-standing partners such as the United States and others, whose defense cooperation with Indonesia has been critical over the years.

For the TNI, which is in the midst of modernizing its weapons systems, this lack of strategic clarity is especially problematic. What Indonesia needs is not opportunistic deals with whichever partner offers the most attractive package, but a deliberate and systematic approach to defense partnerships that supports long-term capacity building.

Here, the wisdom of Indonesian international law scholar Hikmahanto Juwana offers a timely reminder. The University of Indonesia professor insists that the principle of an “independent and active” (bebas-aktif) foreign policy must remain Indonesia’s anchor. “Indonesia must safeguard its independent and active foreign policy, whether in relation to China, the U.S., or any other state,” he argues.

His point is simple but vital: neutrality should not be a slogan, but a carefully implemented doctrine − one that requires a clear foreign policy white paper as its foundation.

The broader question, then, is unavoidable: Where is Indonesia’s defense strategy heading? Asta Cita outlines a progressive vision rooted in national resilience and self-reliance. But without a foreign policy framework that defines national interests with clarity and consistency, Indonesia risks losing strategic footing in both regional and global arenas. The time has come for Jakarta to match its ambitions with a coherent roadmap− before defense modernization becomes adrift in a sea of competing pressures.

The writer is a Senior Consultant at Marapi Consulting & Advisory, Jakarta.

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